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CHAPTER 11 TRIAGE: DIAGNOSING A 
DEBTOR'S PROSPECTS FOR SUCCESS 
Anne Lawton * 
This Article presents the results of a large empirical study of Chapter II cases 
filed in 2004, the year before Congress enacted the small business reforms in the 
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act ("BAPCPA "). The 
study confirms what the National Bankruptcy Review Commission 
("Commission") and Congress suspected: Overall rates of plan success are low in 
Chapter II, and those low rates are largely attributable to the small Chapter II 
debtor. Congress, however, did a better job than the Commission at determining 
the criteria for identifying debtors with low prospects for success in Chapter II. 
Committee formation-present in the Code's small business debtor definition but 
absent in the Commission's definition-was significantly associated with increased 
rates of plan confirmation and successful plan performance. In addition, the $2 
million liability cutoff that Congress put into place in BAPCPA generally served as 
a better predictor than the Commission's $5 million limit of the point at which 
plan confirmation and performance rates became significant. 
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University, whose statistical work and explanations of statistical concepts enriched the 
analysis in this Article. In addition, the insights on all matters statistical from my colleague 
Barbara O'Brien and Jacquline Cottle, Assistant Professor of Psychology at Roger Williams 
University, proved invaluable. My thanks to Professor Michelle Hamer, who took the time 
to provide valuable commentary on the Article's analysis, and to my colleagues Mae 
Kuykendall and Barbara Bean for their insights and encouragement as this project unfolded 
over time. Last, but certainly not least, I want to thank my research assistants, Lyndsay 
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INTRODUCTION 
For more than two decades, judges and commentators have debated 
whether Chapter II is working. 1 After the enactment of the Bankruptcy Code 
("Code") in I978, concerns soon emerged about Chapter 11. The available 
empirical evidence, while limited in scope, showed startlingly low rates of plan 
confirmation, ranging from 6.5% to 17%.2 As time passed, conventional wisdom 
had it that the small business debtor accounted for these low rates of plan 
confirmation. 3 Thus, in I994, Congress amended the Code to provide a small 
business election, designed, in part, to simplify certain aspects of the plan 
confirmation process. Simplification meant lower cost, which supposedly would 
translate into higher confirmation rates. 
Congress, with an eye to reform, also created the Commission to study 
various "issues and problems relating" to the Code's operation.4 The Commission 
issued its report and recommendations in I997. The Commission proposed ten 
changes to the existing Chapter 1I, all aimed at decreasing obstacles to plan 
confirmation and increasing oversight of small Chapter 1I debtors. 5 The 
1. See, e.g., Michael Bradley & Michael Rosenzweig, The Untenable Case for 
Chapter 11, I 01 YALE L.J. 1043, 1088-89 (1992) (arguing for the repeal of Chapter 11 
based on authors' conclusion that there are "no economic benefits from court-supervised 
corporate reorganizations"); Lynn M. LoPucki, The Trouble with Chapter I I, 1993 WIS. L. 
REv. 729,730 (claiming that it is "clear that something is very wrong with Chapter 11"); 
Judge A. Thomas Small, If You Fix It, They Will Come-A New Playing Field for Small 
Business Bankruptcies, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 981, 983 (2005) (proposing a small business 
chapter to address the cost and complexity of Chapter 11 for small business debtors); 
Elizabeth Warren & Jay Lawrence Westbrook, The Success of Chapter Jl: A Challenge to 
the Critics, 107 MICH. L. REV. 603, 638 (2009) [hereinafter Challenge] (claiming that 
Chapter 11 works well and that bankruptcy courts prior to the 2005 amendments to the 
Code "were doing a very good job of resolving cases quickly"); Elizabeth Warren, The 
Untenable Case for Repeal of Chapter Il, 102 YALE L.J. 437, 478-79 (1992)(arguing that 
Bradley and Rosenzweig's data were unsound, thereby calling into serious question their 
call for repeal of Chapter 11 ). 
2. See NAT'L BANKR. REVIEW COMM'N, BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY 
YEARS 610-11 (1997) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT], available at http://govinfo.library 
.unt.edu/nbrc/reportcont.html (summarizing results of several Chapter 11 studies). 
3. See generally id. 
4. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 U.S.C. § 603(1) (1994). 
5. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 609-60. 
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Commission's recommendations, while seemingly geared to small business 
debtors, applied to any Chapter ll debtor, whether engaged in business or not. 6 
Eight years later, with the exception of the "small business debtor" definition, the 
Commission's proposals made their way, in substantially unchanged form, into 
current law with the enactment ofBAPCPA.7 
While debate exists about what constitutes success in Chapter 11, many 
agree-Congress and the Commission included-that a central purpose of Chapter 
11 is the rehabilitation, through the Code's plan process, of financially distressed 
debtors.8 In this Article, then, I use plan confirmation and performance as the 
measure of Chapter 11 success. 9 Using data from a random sample drawn from the 
entire population of Chapter 11 cases filed in 2004, I examine the relationship of 
two factors-the formation of an official unsecured creditors' committee and the 
size of a debtor's liabilities-to rates of plan confirmation and performance. 
As the study's results reveal, the rate of J'lan confirmation is not nearly as 
dismal as that suggested by the Commission. 1 Nonetheless, it is indeed quite 
low--only about a third of debtors that file for relief under Chapter 11 ever 
confirm a plan. 11 Moreover, Congress and the Commission were right: Small 
debtors are the reason for the low confirmation rate in Chapter 11. 
All debtors are not created equal, however, in terms of their prospects for 
success in Chapter 11. First, cases with an official committee of unsecured 
creditors had significantly higher rates of plan confirmation and successful plan 
performance than did cases with no committee. Second, debtors with larger 
aggregate liabilities had significantly higher rates of plan confirmation and 
successful plan performance than did debtors with smaller aggregate liabilities. 
But, a comparison of the Code's $2-million-liability limit with the Commission's 
$5 million limit for small Chapter 11 debtors reveals that the $2 million cutoff 
better captures, in general, the point at which a debtor's prospects for confirming 
and successfully performing a Chapter 11 plan significantly improve. Thus, two of 
the criteria found in the Code's definition of a small business debtor predict, at a 
6. See infra notes 33, 44--45 and accompanying text for an explanation of the 
Commission's definition. 
7. See Thomas E. Carlson & Jennifer Frasier Hayes, The Small Business 
Provisions of the 2005 Bankruptcy Amendments, 79 AM. BANKR. L.J. 645,647 (2005). 
8. See, e.g., COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 611 (footnote omitted) 
(stating that the "appropriate use of Chapter II" is one in which the debtor "confirms and 
materially performs a plan of reorganization"); Challenge, supra note 1, at 611 (stating that 
"plan confirmation is surely the central measure of success in Chapter II"). 
9. I use the term "performance" because it covers a broader concept of success 
than does the Code's term "substantial consummation." The Code defines "substantial 
consummation" as the transfer of property provided for by the plan, assumption by the 
debtor or its successor of the business or property dealt with by the plan, and the beginning 
of plan distributions. See 11 U.S.C. § 1101(2) (2012). By comparison, "successful 
performance" includes debtors who consummate a plan and do not subsequently re-file for 
bankruptcy under any chapter of the Code. See infra note 100 and accompanying text. 
10. See infra Part liLA. 
II. See infra Part liLA. 
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statistically significant level, plan confirmation and performance rates. The 
legislative history, however, suggests that happenstance, not insight, accounts for 
this result. 
I begin the Article, in Part I, by tracing the evolution of the Code's 
current small business debtor definition, noting the differences between the Code's 
and the Commission's definitions of a small Chapter 11 debtor. Part II of the 
Article then describes the population of cases from which the study's random 
sample is drawn, the process of obtaining the data that form the basis of this study, 
and the study's basic design. In Part III, I discuss the results of the statistical 
analysis conducted on the random sample data. Part III.A presents the findings on 
overall plan proposal, confirmation, and performance rates. In Part III.B, I present 
the study's findings that creditor committee formation and debtor liability size are 
significantly associated with greater odds of plan confirmation and successful plan 
performance. I conclude with a brief explanation of the limitations of the study's 
findings, including a cautionary note about misconstruing the study's results to 
find causal links where none may exist. I also make suggestions for further 
empirical work, mindful of the need to balance the benefits of reform against its 
not insignificant costs. 
I. THE EVOLUTION OF A DEFINITION 
In 1978, Congress enacted the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which 
consolidated Chapters X, XI, and XII of the Bankruptcy Act (the "Act") into a 
single reorganization chapter-Chapter 11. 12 Under the Act, Chapters X and XI 
were the main chapters that businesses used to reorganize. 13 Chapter X was 
intended for publicly held firms and Chapter XI for smaller, privately held 
enterprises. 14 The problem, however, was that nothing in the Act restricted a 
publicly held firm from filing under Chapter XI. 15 Large publicly held companies 
chose Chapter XI, in part, because it allowed management to retain control during 
the reorganization process. 16 Uncertainty over which chapter applied to the 
reorganization of large publicly held firms spawned "pointless and wasteful 
12. Ralph A. Peeples, Staying in: Chapter 11, Close Corporations and the 
Absolute Priority Rule, 63 AM. BANKR. L.J. 65,66 (1989). Chapter X was designed for large 
corporate reorganizations; Chapter XI for unsecured debt adjustment by corporations, 
individuals, and partnerships; and Chapter XII for secured debt adjustment by individuals 
and partnerships. See H.R. Doc. No. 93-137, at 23 (1973), reprinted in B-4c COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY APP. pt. 4(c) [hereinafter 1973 COMMISSION REPORT]. 
13. See S. REP. No. 95-989, at 9 (1978), reprinted in D-4E COLLIER ON 
BANKRUPTCY APP. pt. 4 [hereinafter 1978 SENATE REPORT). 
14. ld. 
15. See id. (stating that the design of the Act was "flawed somewhat by the 
failure to include a definition of a 'public company"'). 
16. See Peeples, supra note 12, at 67 (noting that "[b]ecause a Chapter X 
proceeding required the appointment of a trustee, surrender of control by existing 
management usually followed" (footnote omitted)). 
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litigation," with the "patient ... dy[ing] while the doctors argue[d] over which 
operating table he should be on."17 
The Code, with its single business reorganization chapter, succeeded in 
"eliminat[ing] unprofitable litigation" over chapter choice, 18 but concerns soon 
emerged about the expense and time associated with Chapter Il 's plan 
confirmation process. 19 Judges and commentators wondered whether Chapter II 
suited the needs of smaller debtors. "[T]he costs [of Chapter II] are too high. It is 
also true that Chapter 11 contains too many obstacles, and the reorganization of 
small businesses under Chapter I1 is simply too difficult for many businesses. "20 
Congress responded to these concerns by creating a small business 
election in the Bankruptcy Reform Act of I994 ("I994 Amendments").21 The 
election allowed small business debtors to expedite the plan confirmation process 
by consolidating into a single hearing the previously separate disclosure statement 
and plan confirmation hearings. 22 The time and money saved by a consolidated 
hearing were offset, however, by the requirement that debtors electing small 
business treatment file a plan within 160 days of the petition. 23 As a consequence, 
few debtors chose the small business election. 24 
The I994 Amendments defined a small business as 
a person engaged in commercial or business activities (but does not 
include a person whose primary activity is the business of owning or 
operating real property and activities incidental thereto) whose 
aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as 
of the date of the petition do not exceed $2,000,000. 25 
17. See 1973 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 12, at 23. 
18. 1978 SENATE REPORT, supra note 13, at 9. 
19. See Karen Gross & Patricia Redmond, In Defense of Debtor Exclusivity: 
Assessing Four of the 1994 Amendments to the Bankruptcy Code, 69 AM. BANKR. L.J. 287, 
287 n.2 (1995) (listing articles that discuss concerns about the cost and delay associated 
with Chapter 11); LoPucki, supra note I, at 730-31 (noting that "something is very wrong 
with Chapter 11 ... the burgeoning expense, the excessive debtor leverage, the poor 
performance of the reorganizing companies, and the high rate of recidivism" (footnotes 
omitted)). 
20. Small, supra note 1, at 981; see also Judge LeifM. Clark, Chapter 11-Does 
One Size Fit All?, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 167, 176 (1996) (noting that the 1994 
amendments to the Code "reflect[ ed] a perceived need to 'tailor' chapter 11 to fit certain 
kinds of situations, a tacit acknowledgment that, after all, perhaps one size does not fit all" 
(emphasis added)); Peeples, supra note 12, at 66 (discussing the "wisdom of developing a 
separate set of rules for close corporations"). 
21. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, 108 Stat. 4106 
(1994). 
22. Carlson & Hayes, supra note 7, at 646. 
23. Jd. 
24. Jd. Approximately 23% of the debtors in the random sample identified 
themselves as small business debtors on the petition. 
25. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, 11 USCA §§ 101, § 217(a) (1994). 
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Unfortunately, there is little legislative history to the 1994 Amendments that 
explains why Congress made the choices that it did. For example, why did 
Congress choose not to apply the small business election to all Chapter 11 debtors, 
regardless of whether or not they were engaged in business?26 Concerns about the 
impact of Chapter 11 's complex rules and cost on plan confirmation rates applied 
with equal vigor to small non-business Chapter 11 debtors. Yet, the House Report 
offers only the following one-sentence rationale for amending the Code to provide 
for the small business election. "This section amends title 11 to expedite the 
process by which small businesses may reorganize under chapter 11."27 There is no 
other discussion and also no explanation of why Congress chose $2 million as the 
liability limit for the new small business debtor definition. 
Earlier legislative efforts to create special rules for small business debtors 
also shed no light on why Congress selected $2 million as the liability limit in the 
1994 Amendments. In both 1992 and 1993, legislation was introduced in the 
Senate to create a new Chapter 10 for small business debtors. 28 The 1992 bill 
established the liability limit for small business debtors at $1,500,000;29 in 1993, it 
was set at $2,500,000.30 In neither case, however, did the Senate Reports explain 
the reason for the liability limits selected. It seems that Congress split the 
difference in the 1994 Amendments; the $2 million liability limit lies midway 
between the $1.5 and $2.5 million figures proposed in 1992 and 1993, 
respectively.31 
In 1997, the Commission, which Congress created with the 1994 
Amendments, issued its report and recommendations for reform of the Code. The 
Commission's report included a set of proposals aimed at "strengthen[ing] the 
1994 'small business' amendments to reduce the cost and delay in small business 
Chapter 11 cases."32 The Commission defined a small business debtor as 
any debtor in a case under Chapter 11 (including any group of 
affiliated debtors) which has aggregate noncontingent, liquidated 
secured and unsecured debts as of the petition date or order for relief 
of five million dollars ($5,000,000) or less and any single asset real 
estate debtor as defined in 11 U.S.C. §101(51B) regardless of the 
amount of such debtor's liabilities.33 
While the Commission found "the lack of data available to evaluate the 
Chapter 11 system ... particularly troubling,"34 it proposed a $5 million liability 
26. Individual "consumer" debtors may file for relief under Chapter 11. Toibb v. 
Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) ("The plain language of the Bankruptcy Code permits 
individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under Chapter 11."). 
27. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 50, 88 (1994). 
28. S. REP. No. 102-279, at 5, 32 (1992); S. REP. No. 103-168, at7 (1993). 
29. SeeS. REP. No. 102-279, at 5, 59. 
30. SeeS. REP. No. 103-168, at 7. 
31. H.R. REP. No. 103-835, at 50. 
32. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 609. 
33. !d. at 618 (footnote omitted). 
34. !d. at 308. 
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limit, rather than the statutory $2 million limit, based on liability data drawn from 
five judicial districts. 35 The Commission selected the $5 million cutoff after 
concluding that in cases with debt levels below $5 million "creditor 
participation ... so often tends to be absent that imposition of the higher standards 
for small business cases is necessary. "36 
The purpose of sorting debtors in this manner was to identify those 
debtors at risk for failure in Chapter 11.37 In other words, the definition served an 
initial triaging function, identifying debtors with reduced prospects for success in 
Chapter 11. But the Commission recognized that not all small debtors face the 
same difficulties in Chapter 11. Thus, the Commission proposed two categories of 
reform measures, premised on its conclusion that there are two kinds of 
problematic Chapter 11 debtors. The Commission recommended mandatory 
reporting requirements and increased oversight of small debtors to more quickly 
shepherd out of bankruptcy debtors with no genuine prospect for reorganization. 38 
At the same time, the Commission proposed more flexible rules for disclosure 
statements and plans to cut costs and improve confirmation rates for debtors with 
better prospects for rehabilitation. 39 
Eight years later, with the enactment of BAPCPA, Congress adopted the 
Commission's small business recommendations, largely unamended.4° Congress, 
however, did not adopt the Commission's definition of a small business debtor,41 
instead retaining the $2 million liability limit established in the 1994 Amendments 
while also making the small business definition longer and more complex. 
The term "small business debtor" 
(A) subject to subparagraph (B), means a person engaged in 
commercial or business activities (including any affiliate of such 
person that is also a debtor under this title and excluding a person 
whose primary activity is the business of owning or operating real 
property or activities incidental thereto) that has aggregate 
noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured debts as of the date 
of the petition or the order for relief in an amount not more than 
$2,000,000 (excluding debts owed to l or more affiliates or insiders) 
for a case in which the United States trustee has not appointed under 
section ll 02(a)(l) a committee of unsecured creditors or where the 
35. ld. at 630-32. The text of the Commission's report says that the data is 
drawn from two districts, but the averages provided in the total liabilities and gross income 
tables are based on data from five districts. The footnotes to the average column for both 
tables state that data from the district of Delaware, although listed on the table, is not 
included in the averages. 
36. ld. at 632. 
37. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 609-10. 
38. See id. at 638-39. 
39. See id. at 635-36. 
40. See Carlson & Hayes, supra note 7, at 647 n.IO. 
41. See 2-101 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY ~101.51 (2011)("The legislative history 
regarding the [small business debtor] definition essentially repeats the statute and does not 
explain why the recommendations of the Commission were rejected .... "). 
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court has determined that the committee of unsecured creditors is 
not sufficiently active and representative to provide effective 
oversight of the debtor; and 
(B) does not include any member of a group of affiliated debtors 
that has aggregate noncontingent liquidated secured and unsecured 
debts in an amount greater than $2,000,000 (excluding debt owed to 
1 or more affiliates or insiders).42 
993 
This definition of a small business debtor varies in several significant 
respects from that of the Commission. First, Congress kept the "commercial or 
business" activity limitation from the 1994 Amendments in the Code's definition 
of small business.43 It is unclear why. The Commission's recommendations 
included a definition entitled "Defining the term 'Small Business. "'44 Nonetheless, 
the actual definition applied to "any debtor in a case under Chapter 11."45 
Bankruptcy reform bills introduced in Congress in the early years after issuance of 
the Commission's report followed the Commission's lead, defining a "small 
business debtor" as any person filing for Chapter 11.46 For some reason not 
explained in the legislative history, Congress decided not to follow the 
Commission's lead and instead retained the business activity restriction from the 
1994 Amendments. 
Second, Congress retained the language from the 1994 Amendments that 
excluded from the definition of small businesses "a person whose primary activity 
is the business of owning or operating real property or activities incidental 
thereto."47 The Commission did not exclude debtors engaged in real property 
activities from small business coverage. Moreover, the Commission's definition 
cross-referenced the Code's definition of a single asset real estate debtor.48 
Congress did not define what constitutes the "primary activity" of "owning or 
operating real property," and BAPCPA's legislative history provides no insight on 
42. H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. I, at 156, 170 (2005) [hereinafter BAPCPA HOUSE 
REPORT]. Apart from the liability limitation, which has increased to $2.343 million pursuant 
to Code-mandated dollar adjustments, the quoted language is the Code's current definition 
of a small business debtor. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(510) (2012); 11 U.S.C. § 104(a)(1) 
(requiring adjustments to the Code's dollar figures every three years, starting with April 1, 
1998). 
43. See BAPCPA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 156, 170. 
44. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 618. 
45. /d. 
46. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, J06th Cong. § 422 (1999) 
(defining a "small business debtor", in relevant part, as "a person" with non-contingent 
liquidated liabilities not exceeding $4 million); H.R. REP. No. 105-540, § 231, at 27 (1998) 
(defining a "small business debtor" in relevant part, as "a person" with non-contingent 
liquidated liabilities of $5 million or less). 
47. BAPCPA HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 156, 170. 
48. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(51B) (2012) (defining "single asset real estate"). 
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how a debtor whose "primary activity is the business of owning or operating real 
property" differs from a single asset real estate debtor.49 
Third, Congress retained the qualification-also present in the 
Commission's definition-that only non-contingent, liquidated liabilities count 
toward the $2 million liability limit for a small business debtor. But Congress 
added language requiring that debts to affiliates and insiders also not be included 
in the $2 million liability cutoff. 50 This additional limitation on computing 
aggregate liabilities first appeared in bankruptcy reform bills proposed after the 
issuance of the Commission's 1997 report, 5 1 but nothing in the legislative history 
explains why. 
Fourth, Congress reverted to the $2 million liability limit first established 
in the 1994 Amendments. "Reverted" is the appropriate word, because the initial 
post-Commission reform legislation introduced in Congress adopted the 
Commission's $5 million recommendation. 52 Then, in successive pieces of 
proposed legislation, Congress dropped the liability limit from $5 to $2 million, in 
$1 million increments. 53 A 2002 Conference Report contains the following two 
sentences about the reduction of the liability limit from $3 to $2 million: "This 
monetary definition is a compromise. The House and Senate antecedents specified 
a $3 million definitional limit."54 Apart from these two sentences, the legislative 
history, once again, is silent on Congress's decision to reject the Commission's $5 
million recommendation. 
The committee-formation proviso is the final difference between the 
Code's current small business definition and the Commission's recommendation. 
The Code excludes from the small business reforms any case in which the United 
States Trustee has appointed an "active and representative" official committee of 
unsecured creditors. Creditor committees first appeared in small business debtor 
definitions in bankruptcy reform legislation introduced in 1998, in the aftermath of 
49. In fact, the legislative history is confusing. The House Report, in explaining 
BAPCPA's amendments to the definition of "single asset real estate," provides that the 
amendments "make[] these debtors subject to the bill's small business reforms." BAPCPA 
HOUSE REPORT, supra note 42, at 19-20. Yet, BAPCPA's definition of a small business 
debtor excludes from the definition any debtor whose primary activity involves real 
property ownership or operation. 
50. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2) (2012) (defining "affiliate"); 11 U.S.C. § 101(31) 
(defining "insider"). 
51. See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 231 
(1998) (adopting the Commission's $5 million liability limit but adding the proviso that 
"debts owed to 1 or more affiliates or insiders" were to be excluded from that $5 million 
limit). 
52. See id. 
53. See id. (providing for $5 million limit); !d. § 402 (1998) (reducing limit to $4 
million); Bankruptcy Reform Act of2000, H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 432 (reducing limit to 
$3 million); H.R. 333, 107th Cong. § 432 (2002) (reducing limit to $2 million); see also 
Carlson & Hayes, supra note 7, at 665-67 (describing process of reducing liability limits in 
small business definition). 
54. H.R. REP. No. 107-617, at 231 (2002)(Conf. Rep.). 
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the release of the Commission's report. The proposed legislation, however, defined 
a small business debtor as one with, not without, an active and representative 
official creditors' committee. 55 The sponsors of reform legislation soon changed 
course, excluding from the definition of a small business debtor any case with an 
active and representative committee. 56 It is unclear why Congress did so. But a one 
paragraph discussion of the small business reforms in BAPCPA's legislative 
history suggests that Congress considered the absence of creditor participation and, 
hence, oversight in smaller Chapter 11 cases to be a problem that necessitated 
close monitoring by the Office of the United States Trustee in order to "weed out" 
those small debtors with no real prospects for reorganization. 57 
It is unclear why Congress deviated from the Commission's small 
business debtor definition or why it altered the definition originally put in place by 
the 1994 Amendments. The legislative history offers few insights and no empirical 
evidence to support Congress's choices. One thing, however, is clear: The Code's 
definition is more complex than the Commission's, which makes the initial 
triaging decision more difficult. 
II. THE STUDY'S DESIGN 
A. Constructing the Population of Cases 
The population for this study is all Chapter 11 cases filed between 
January 1, 2004, and December 31,2004.58 The population includes all cases filed 
by any individual or artificial entity eligible to file for relief under Chapter 11 of 
the Code.59 I created the population of cases by conducting district-by-district 
searches on PACER60 in all 94 U.S. judicial districts.61 The population includes 
55. See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1998, H.R. 3150, 105th Cong. § 402 (1998); 
see also Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1999, S. 625, 106th Cong. § 422 (1999). 
56. See, e.g., S. 3186, 106th Cong. § 432 (2000). 
57. See H.R. REP. No. 109-31, pt. 1, at 19 (2005). 
58. This study examines only cases filed in calendar year 2004. The next part of 
the study, which examines data obtained from calendar year 2007 cases, currently is 
underway. 
59. See 11 U.S.C. § l09(d) (2012) (listing those eligible to file under Chapter 
11). 
60. PACER, which stands for Public Access to Court Electronic Records, is an 
electronic case service operated by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts 
that allows users, for a per-page fee, to search for and download dockets and documents 
filed in any federal court case, including bankruptcy cases. This project would not have 
been possible without the PACER fee waivers I obtained from the chief bankruptcy judges 
in most of the 94 judicial districts. 
61. One of the challenges of conducting Chapter 11 research is that there are no 
publicly available searchable "databases" of all Chapter 11 filings. Professor Lynn LoPucki 
has created a database oflarge publicly held firms available at http://lopucki.law.ucla.edu/. 
But, no publicly available searchable database of both large and small Chapter 11 filings 
exists. See generally Katherine Porter, The Potential and Peril of BAPCP A for Empirical 
Research, 71 Mo. L. REv. 963 (2006) (discussing the challenges of empirical bankruptcy 
research). Therefore, in order to obtain the entire population of Chapter 11 cases filed in 
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judicial districts in all 50 states, as well as the districts of Guam, Puerto Rico, the 
Northern Mariana Islands, and the Virgin Islands. 62 
There are several things to note about the case population. First, it 
includes all Chapter 11 debtors, not simply artificial entities engaged in business. 
Individuals may file for relief under Chapter 11, and the population includes 
individual debtors, even those who checked the "Consumer/Non-Business" box on 
the petition to describe the nature of their debts. 63 Individuals with primarily 
consumer debts do not qualify as small business debtors under the Code; the 
definition requires a person to be engaged in "commercial or business activities. "64 
The Commission's recommendations, on the other hand, applied to "any debtor in 
a case under Chapter 11 ,"65 not merely those debtors engaged in business. It is 
unclear why Congress chose not to include non-business Chapter 11 debtors in 
BAPCP A's small debtor reforms. 66 The purpose of this study is to identify certain 
predictors of Chapter 11 success, focusing on a comparison of the statutory and 
Commission definitions of small debtors. Thus, the random sample includes both 
"consumer" and "business" Chapter 11 debtors.67 
Practical considerations also favored including self-identified "consumer" 
debtors in the sample. Debtors "commonly misdesignate consumer debt as 
business debt and vice versa."68 It was not unusual in the random sample to find a 
mismatch between the information on the debtor's petition and that on the 
schedules and statement of financial affairs. 69 Some debtors checked consumer 
debts on their petition but nonetheless really were filing as a business. 70 The 
2004, I and my research assistants conducted four distinct searches within each judicial 
district: (1) cases in Chapter 11 on the search date, (2) cases that had converted from 
Chapter 11 to Chapter 7, (3) cases that had converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 12, and 
(4) cases that had converted from Chapter 11 to Chapter 13. 
62. No Chapter 11 cases were filed in 2004 in either Guam or the Northern 
Mariana Islands. 
63. See supra note 26. 
64. 11 U.S.C § 101(51D)(A). 
65. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 618. 
66. See supra note 43-46 and accompanying text. 
67. As discussed more fully infra note 113, the success rates for self-identified 
"consumer" debtors did not differ significantly from those for self-identified "business" 
debtors. 
68. Jennifer Connors Frasier, Caught in a Cycle of Neglect: The Accuracy of 
Bankruptcy Statistics, 101 CoM. L.J. 307,313 (1996). 
69. When a debtor files for bankruptcy, it must file schedules of its assets and 
liabilities, as well as a statement of its financial affairs. 11 U.S.C. § 52l(a)(1)(B)(i), (iii) 
(2012). Official Form 6 contains the various schedules while Official Form 7 is the 
Statement of Financial Affairs. All forms are available on the website for the United States 
Courts at http://www. uscourts.gov/F ormsAndF ees/F orms!BankruptcyF orms.aspx. 
70. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, In re Dei Monico, No. 04-38235 (Bankr. N.D. 
Ill. Oct. 14, 2004) (Docket No. l) (joint debtors checked "Consumer/Non-Business" for 
"Nature of Debts" but also checked that they were a small business and that they elected 
small business treatment under the Code); Voluntary Petition, In re Vitello's, Inc., No. 04-
38148 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 27, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (corporate debtor checked 
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degree of apparent debtor error cautioned against eliminating those cases identified 
on the petition as consisting of"Consumer/Non-Business" debts. 
Second, the district-by-district searches yielded a total of 10,384 Chapter 
11 cases filed during calendar year 2004. According to the Administrative Office 
of the United States Courts ("AO"), however, there were only 10,132 Chapter 11 
filings in 2004. Why the difference? At least two reasons exist for the larger 
number of cases in my initial population of 2004 cases than is reported by the AO. 
First, my initial search results included duplicate and serial Chapter ll filings by 
the same debtor. 71 Second, in certain districts, such as the Central District of 
California, intra-district transfer of cases was not uncommon. For example, Huerta 
Design Associates filed for relief under Chapter ll in July 2004,72 but when the 
case was transferred intra-district in June 2005, it was assigned a new case 
number. 73 The case came up twice, sporting different case numbers, in my initial 
search results. After making these adjustments, 10,163 cases remained. 74 
"Consumer/Non-Business" for "Nature of Debts" but also checked "Corporation" for "Type 
of Debtor"); Voluntary Petition, In re Witherspoon, No. 04-12437 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. April 
27, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (individual debtor checked "Consumer/Non-Business" for 
"Nature of Debts" but did business as lawn and garden center, and scheduled debts were 
largely those of the business); Voluntary Petition, In re Doyle, No. 04-00524 (Bankr. 
D.D.C. March 30, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (petition filed in name of individual debtor who 
checked "Consumer/Non-Business" for "Nature of Debts" but also checked "Individual" 
and "Partnership" for "Type of Debtor" and elected Chapter 11 small business treatment); 
Amended Voluntary Petition, In "re Heithaus, No. 04-50044 (Bankr. D. Conn. March 15, 
2004) (Docket No. 50) (individual debtor checked "Consumer/Non-Business" for "Nature 
of Debts" but also elected small business treatment under the Code); Voluntary Petition, In 
re Nelson, No. 04-09867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. March 12, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (individual 
debtor checked "Consumer/Non-Business for "Nature of Debts" on petition but also 
indicated under "All Other Names used by the Debtor in the last 6 years" that individual 
was doing business as "SG Nelson Company"); Voluntary Petition, In re Blakeslee, No. 04-
00865 (Bankr. W.O. Mich. Jan. 28, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (joint debtors checked 
"Consumer/Non-Business" for "Nature of Debts" but also checked that they were a small 
business); see also Order Substantively Consolidating Mountain States Investments, LLC 
into the Bankruptcy Estate of Lie H. Tan, In re Tan, No. 04-61694 (Bankr. D. Or. Aprilll, 
2006) (Docket No. 523) (individual debtor checked "Consumer/Non-Business" on Chapter 
7 petition, but after conversion to Chapter 11 the bankruptcy court substantively 
consolidated case of debtor's limited liability company into debtor's individual bankruptcy 
case). 
71. Compare Order Dismissing Case with Prejudice Nunc Pro Tunc, In re 
Reichardt, No. 04-33138 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 2, 2004) (Docket No. 2) (dismissed for 
violating 365-day bar to filing established in 2003 bankruptcy case), with In re Reichardt, 
No. 04-34090 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 31, 2004) (second 2004 case filed outside 365-day bar 
established in dismissal of2003 bankruptcy case). 
72. See Docket, In re Huerta Design Assocs., No. 04-25983 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
July 22, 2004). 
73. See Docket, In re Huerta Design Assocs., No. 05-13854 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 
June 1, 2005). 
74. Even after adjusting for duplicate and serial filers, as well as intra-district 
transfers, the population included I 0,163 cases, or 31 more Chapter II cases than indicated 
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Finally, before drawing' the random sample, I made one additional 
adjustment to the population data. 75 In 2004, the Footstar debtors, 2529 affiliated 
entities, filed for relief under Chapter 11 in the Southern District of New York. 76 
The debtors' cases were both jointly administered and substantively 
consolidated,77 and the bankruptcy court confirmed a single joint plan covering all 
2529 debtors.78 Therefore, I eliminated 2528 cases (all but In re Footstar, Inc./9 
the lead case) from the final population of cases. Otherwise, the presence of 2528 
additional debtors in the population would have skewed the results because the 
Footstar debtors filed for bankruptcy on the same date, filed their schedules on a 
consolidated basis, 80 and proposed and confirmed the same plan on the same 
by the AO's figures. There was no pattern, however, to the district-by-district results. In 45 
districts, my search results produced more case filings than those reported by the AO, in 19 
districts the search results match those reported by the AO, and in 30 districts I found fewer 
cases than reported by the AO. The discrepancy in some districts may be due to a failure to 
eliminate all duplicate or serial filings, but the variation across districts in number of case 
filings when compared with the AO's figures suggests some unexplained anomaly 
associated with the search functions on PACER. In fact, after drawing the random sample, I 
had to eliminate two cases because neither was a Chapter 11 case filed in 2004. See infra 
note 84. 
75. I did further culling of jointly administered and/or substantively consolidated 
cases after drawing the random sample. I explain that process infra in Part II.B. I was able 
to eliminate the Footstar-related cases prior to drawing the random sample because the 
number of cases involved made it an outlier and easy to identify among the more than 
10,000 cases in the population. Given the size of the 2004 case population, it was 
impossible to make such an a priori judgment call for any other cases; doing so would have 
required pulling dockets and documents for thousands of cases to determine whether the 
court had ordered substantive consolidation or whether multiple debtors had filed a single 
joint plan. Such a process simply was not feasible. 
76. See Voluntary Petition Ex. A, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. 
S.D.N.Y. March 2, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (listing names of the other 2528 affiliated debtors 
that filed for Chapter 11 on March 2, 2004). 
77. Order Pursuant to Rule 1015(b) of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy 
Procedure Directing Joint Administration of Chapter 11 Cases, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-
22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. March 3, 2004) (Docket No. 37); Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 
363 and 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code and Bankruptcy Rules 1017 and 9014 Granting 
Substantive Consolidation, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 
2005) (Docket No. 2839). See infra note 86 for a brief explanation of the difference 
between procedural consolidation or joint administration, and substantive consolidation. 
78. Order Confirming Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization 
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Dated December 5, 2005, In re Footstar, Inc., 
No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (Docket No. 3267). 
79. No. 04-22350. 
80. Three consolidated sets of schedules were filed based on the company's 
divisions: (1) Corporate; (2) Athletic; and (3) Meldisco. See Corporate Debtors' Schedules, 
In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2004) (Docket No. 684); 
Athletic Debtors' Schedules, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 
2004) (Docket No. 686); Meldisco Debtors' Schedules, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 15, 2004) (Docket No. 687). 
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date. 81 Given the size of the Foots tar bankruptcy, multiple Footstar debtors would 
have ended up in the random sample had all 2528 eliminated cases been included 
in the population of cases. Rather than eliminate multiple Footstar debtors after 
drawing the random sample, I did so beforehand. The Footstar cases, however, are 
represented in the random sample because In re Footstar, the lead case, was drawn 
as part of that sample. 
B. The Random Sample 
The Footstar adjustment left 7635 Chapter ll cases in the population. 82 
Each case remaining in the adjusted population was assigned a random number 
using a random number generator. The initial random sample contained 878 cases, 
which is 11.5% of the population of 7635 Footstar-adjusted Chapter 11 cases. The 
initial sample included cases from 89 of the 92 judicial districts in which debtors 
filed Chapter 11 cases in 2004.83 There were no bankruptcy filings in either the 
District of Guam or the District of the Northern Mariana Islands. 
Of these 878 cases, 80 were eliminated from the random sample. Of the 
80 cases, 3 were mistakenly included (2 due to PACER errors) in the Chapter 11 
population described above in Part II.A.84 Four other cases are still open, as of 
January 2012, with no dispositive action taken-e.g., conversion, dismissal, or 
plan confirmation-and, thus, also were removed from the sample. 85 
I eliminated the other 73 cases to maintain the independence of the data 
and to avoid skewing the study's results. In some of these 73 cases, the debtors 
were members of a jointly administered case in which the court confirmed a joint 
plan of reorganization or liquidation providing for substantive consolidation86 of 
81. See Order Confirming Debtors' First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization 
Under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, Dated December 5, 2005, In re Footstar, Inc., 
No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Jan. 27, 2006) (Docket No. 3267). 
82. The original population contained 10,163 cases, and 2528 were eliminated, 
thereby leaving 7635 cases. 
83. The random number generator did not "select" any cases for the random 
sample from the following three judicial districts: (1) the Middle District of Alabama, (2) 
the District of North Dakota, or (3) the District of the Virgin Islands. 
84. See In re Grady, No. 04-14883 (Bankr. E.D. Ark. April 22, 2004) (Chapter 
13 case incorrectly included by PACER in its search results for Chapter II cases converted 
to Chapter 7); In re Nelson, No. 04-09867 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. March 12, 2004) (first of two 
filings by same debtor that was not culled from the population prior to random sample); In 
re Childress, No. 04-104 70 (Bankr. D. Md. Jan. 8, 2004) (2003 Chapter I I case filed in the 
bankruptcy court for the District of Columbia, and then transferred to the bankruptcy court 
for the District of Maryland in 2004 and given a 2004 case number). 
85. See In re Reagan, No. 04-77590 (Bankr. W.D. Ark. Nov. 11, 2004); In re 
RFI Realty, Inc., No. 04-10486 (Bankr. D. Ariz. June 15, 2004); In re LaVigne, No. 04-
64078 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. June 4, 2004); In re North Plaza, LLC, No. 04-00769 (Bankr. S.D. 
Cal. Jan. 28, 2004). As of the writing of this Article, 38 other cases are administratively 
open, but in all 38 the court has confirmed a plan, or has dismissed or converted the case. 
86. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permit a court to enter an order 
directing the joint administration, or procedural consolidation, of affiliated debtors. FED. R. 
BANKR. P. 1015(b). In a jointly administered case, docketing occurs on the docket for the 
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the debtors for plan voting and/or claim distribution purposes.87 In others, the 
eliminated debtors were members of a jointly administered case in which petition 
filing dates, document filing dates, and/or dispositive actions, such as confirmation 
or dismissal, tracked those of an affiliated debtor already included in the random 
sample. 88 This study examines the relationship of two factors-the formation of an 
official unsecured creditors' committee and the size of a debtor's liabilities-to 
Chapter II success, as measured by plan confirmation rates. Including multiple 
debtors from these jointly administered cases would have skewed the study's 
results, because the affiliated debtors operated as if they were a single entity, at 
least for purposes of plan proposal and confirmation, or other dispositive action, 
such as dismissal or conversion to Chapter 7. 
Eliminating these 80 cases left 798 cases in the random sample, or I 0.5% 
of the Footstar-adjusted original population of Chapter ll cases. The eliminations 
did not alter the number of districts represented. The final sample includes cases 
from 89 of the 92 judicial districts in which debtors filed Chapter ll cases in 
2004.89 
C. Obtaining the Data 
For each case in the random sample, my research assistants and I 
collected the docket and documents needed to complete a data collection 
instrument ("DCI") that I had designed for this project. We coded information 
from the petition, schedules, plans, and dispositive orders on the DCI, and then 
input the coded DCis into a database.90 With the exception of eight judicial 
districts, we found the necessary documents for the DC Is on PACER. In these 
eight districts, however, access to case documents on PACER was limited or 
"lead" case, but the affiliated debtors' assets and liabilities are not combined. Thus, 
creditors have recourse only to the assets of the debtor for which they are a creditor, not to 
the combined assets of all affiliated debtors in the jointly administered case. There is no 
specific Code section or rule providing for substantive case consolidation. With substantive 
consolidation, the "assets and liabilities of different legal entities [are] consolidated and 
dealt with as if the assets were held by and the liabilities were owed by a single legal 
entity." 2 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY~ 105.09 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds., 
16th ed. 2011). 
87. See, e.g., Order Confirming Debtors' Second Amended and Restated Joint 
Plan under Chapter II of the Bankruptcy Code as Modified~ 37 at 16, In re International 
Wire Group, Inc., No 04-11991 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2004) (Docket No. 291) 
(holding that "each and every Claim filed or to be filed in the Chapter 11 cases shall be 
deemed filed against the deemed consolidated Debtors and shall be deemed one Claim 
against, and obligation of, the deemed consolidated Debtors"). 
88. See, e.g., Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan, In re Duris, No. 04-18655 
(Bankr. E.D. La. Feb. 10, 2006) (Docket No. 253) (confirming joint plan of partial 
liquidation for three jointly administered cases). The random sample included all three cases 
covered by the joint plan of liquidation. I kept the "lead" case in the random sample and 
eliminated the other two. 
89. See supra note 83. 
90. My gratitude to Scott Nagele of MSU College of Law, who constructed the 
database and worked with me on refining, through numerous iterations, the DCI. 
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simply unavailable for bankruptcy cases filed in calendar year 2004.91 For these 
eight districts, most documents were obtained, for a fee, either directly from the 
judicial district, or in most cases, from the regional office for the National 
Archives and Records Administration. 92 
D. Defining Success 
What makes for a successful Chapter II case? There is no simple answer 
to the question. Some judges and commentators question the focus on plan 
confirmation as the sole measure of Chapter 11 success. 93 For example, a debtor 
may exit Chapter II without a confirmed plan but after having reached a 
satisfactory settlement with creditors.94 Nonetheless, "plan confirmation is surely 
the central measure of success in Chapter II."95 In fact, the low rate of plan 
confirmation in Chapter II served as the impetus not only for the Commission's 
creation but also Congress' adoption of the Code's small business provisions. 
Thus, in this Article, I use plan confirmation and performance to measure Chapter 
II success. 
I tested three variations of this basic definition of "success." The first is 
initial success, i.e. plan confirmation, and this can be a plan of reorganization, a 
91. Access to documents on PACER is limited for bankruptcy cases filed in 
2004 for the following judicial districts: (I) Northern District of Alabama, (2) Southern 
District of Florida, (3) Middle District of Georgia, (4) Eastern District of Michigan, (5) 
Southern District of Mississippi, (6) Eastern District of Tennessee, (7) Middle District of 
Tennessee, and (8) Western District of Virginia. Access to documents on PACER also is 
limited for the District of the Virgin Islands, but no cases from that district were selected by 
the random number generator for inclusion in the random sample. 
92. I want to thank Danny W. Armstrong, the Clerk of Court for the Eastern 
District of Tennessee, who provided me with the necessary documents free of charge. I also 
wish to acknowledge the invaluable assistance that Kristy Cobb, an Administrative Support 
Specialist in the Northern District of Alabama, and Sheila Skinner-Grant, an Operations 
Support Specialist in the Southern District of Florida, provided to me in locating documents 
for cases in their judicial districts. 
93. See, e.g., Judge James B. Haines, Jr. & Philip J. Hendel, No Easy Answers: 
Small Business Bankruptcies After BAPCPA, 47 B.C. L. REv. 71,75 (2005) (arguing that the 
focus on plan confirmation as the sole measure of success "ignores, among other things, that 
the essential purpose of the process is to rehabilitate the debtor while treating creditors 
fairly"). 
94. See, e.g., Transcript of Hearing Held on Oral Ruling on Joint Motion to 
Approve Settlement Agreement and/or Dismiss at 12, In re Paradox Partners, LLC, No. 04-
26279 (Bankr. D. Colo. Sept. 19, 2005) (Docket No. 369) (commending parties for 
"maximiz[ing] the chances of recovery for everyone involved" and noting that while a plan 
was not confirmed, the case "provided a venue within which people could sit down and slug 
it out" in an open and vigorous fashion); Challenge, supra note 1, at 611 (noting that not 
every dismissal is a "complete failure," because dismissal may occur after "debtors and 
creditors have worked out a settlement that they were not able to achieve prior to the 
Chapter 11 filing"). While the Commission defined success as plan confirmation, it 
acknowledged that many practitioners did not necessarily equate case dismissal without 
confirmation as a Chapter 11 failure. See COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 308. 
95. Challenge, supra note 1, at 611. 
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plan of liquidation, or a mixed plan of reorganization and liquidation. I included 
liquidating plans in the study for several reasons. The Code specifically provides 
for liquidating plans,96 and thus, "confirmation of such a plan successfully resolves 
a case in Chapter 11. "97 In addition, a liquidating plan under Chapter II is not 
necessarily the equivalent of liquidation under Chapter 7. 98 For example, a 
liquidating plan may provide for the sale of a firm on a going-concern basis, 
thereby preserving the business, albeit under different ownership. 99 More 
importantly, however, this study examines the impact on plan confirmation rates of 
elements in the statutory and Commission definitions of a small Chapter 11 debtor. 
These definitions apply with equal force to debtors proposing and confirming 
plans of reorganization or plans ofliquidation. 
The second variation is ultimate success, which takes account of plan 
failure. A case that is ultimately successful is one for which the bankruptcy court 
did not convert or dismiss the case post-confirmation, and the debtor did not 
subsequently re-file for bankruptcy under any chapter of the Code. 100 
It is important not to confuse ultimate success with the third measure of 
success-success on confirmation. While both ultimate success and success on 
confirmation take account of plan failure, the difference in the two measures lies in 
the sample of cases tested. Ultimate success measures rates of plan success using 
the entire sample of cases-e.g., 798 cases for the committee analysis. Success on 
confirmation measures rates of plan success using the sub-sample of confirmed-
96. See II U.S.C. § 1123(b)(4) (2012) (authorizing a liquidating plan). While the 
Code provides for such plans, Professor Lubben found that successful liquidating plans are 
an uncommon phenomenon in Chapter II. See Stephen J. Lubben, Business Liquidation, 81 
AM. BANKR. L.J. 65, 68 (2007) ("Very few creditors ultimately receive the benefits of a 
chapter II liquidation-most chapter II cases convert to chapter 7 and very few liquidating 
plans are ultimately confirmed."). 
97. Challenge, supra note I, at 611. 
98. In his study comparing rates of return to unsecured creditors, Professor 
Lubben found that the average unsecured creditor in Chapter 7 receives "a token payment 
on their claim, about three quarters of one percent of the face value of the claim, and [in] 
most chapter 7 cases ... no payment whatsoever." Lubben, supra note 96, at 80. By 
comparison, Chapter 11 liquidating plans "return a more respectable 20% to unsecured 
creditors-although the standard error is large, and the proper number could be as low as 
6.9% or as high as 34.7%." ld. at 81 (footnote omitted). 
99. See Challenge, supra note 1, at 611 (contrasting two polar opposite versions 
of the liquidating plan-the going-concern sale versus piecemeal disaggregation of a firm 
through individual asset sales). 
I 00. Ultimate success rates may be overstated in this study. Unless there was 
some indication to the contrary in the debtor's initial bankruptcy filing, I and my research 
assistants searched for subsequent bankruptcy filings only in the judicial district in which 
the debtor originally filed its Chapter 11 case. Searching for subsequent filings in 93 other 
judicial districts for 800 cases was simply not feasible. See 28 U.S.C. § 1408(2) (2012) 
(allowing a debtor to file for bankruptcy in any judicial district in which there is a pending 
bankruptcy case by an affiliated debtor). Because the results do not include all possible 
bankruptcy re-filings, failure rates may be under-stated and, hence, ultimate success rates 
overstated. 
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plan cases only-e.g., 269 cases for the committee analysis. For example, a 
finding that cases with committees have significantly higher rates of ultimate 
success than cases without committees means that committee formation predicts 
plan performance for the entire sample of cases; it does not mean that cases with 
committees produce "better" or more feasible plans than no-committee cases. 
Success on confirmation, on the other hand, does measure comparative plan 
feasibility because it examines only those cases in which the debtor confirmed a 
plan. Thus, a finding that committee-cases have significantly higher rates of 
success on confirmation than no-committee cases means that committee formation 
is associated with plan feasibility. 
I then measured initial and ultimate success, and success-on-confirmation 
rates using two basic criteria selected by Congress or the Commission for defining 
a small debtor. The 2-proportion Z-test was used for all statistical analyses 
performed. 101 Statistical testing was conducted at the 0.05 significance level, which 
means that a result is statistically significant if the test's associated p-value is less 
than 0.05. 
The first criterion tested was formation of an official committee of 
unsecured creditors, which Congress added to the small business debtor definition 
in 2005. The random sample for this test consisted of798 cases. 
The second criterion was the size of the debtor's liabilities. As I explain 
more fully in Part III.B.2, 102 the random sample for liability testing consisted of 
782 cases. Cases for committee formation fell into one of two categories-
committee or no committee. But debtor liabilities ranged from the very small, 
under $50,000, to the enormous, over $100 million. While I had specific liability 
figures for the vast majority of cases in the random sample, in approximately 7% 
of the cases I had to rely on liability-range data from the debtor's petition. 103 Thus, 
in order to test the relationship between debtor liabilities and plan success rates, I 
established the following three liability ranges, using the statutory $2 million and 
Commission $5 million figures as liability limits for the ranges: (I) liabilities at or 
below $2 million (":S$2 million"): (2) liabilities over $2 million but not in excess 
of $5 million ("$2 to $5 million"); 104 and (3) liabilities in excess of $5 million 
(">$5 million"). 
Both Congress and the Commission defined a small debtor by reference 
to the debtor's aggregate non-contingent, liquidated liabilities ("NCL liabilities"). 
Therefore, when creating the first set of liability data, I deducted any debt 
identified as contingent or unliquidated105 from the liability totals provided on the 
101. Wenning Feng, a doctoral student in the Department of Statistics and 
Probability at Michigan State University, conducted all the statistical tests for this Article. 
102. See infra Part III.B.2. 
103. See infra notes 125-30 and accompanying text. 
104. For ease of description, I use the phrase "between $2 and $5 million." 
Technically, however, the range covers debtors with liabilities in excess of $2 million but 
less than or equal to $5 million. 
105. In 38 cases, I categorized the debtor on the basis of liability ranges on the 
petition because I did not have access to the schedules and the debtor's identification of 
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debtor's Summary of Schedules. 106 Based on these figures, I then placed each 
debtor into one of the three liability ranges described above. 
Incentives exist, however, for some debtors to underreport their liabilities 
by listing them as contingent or unliquidated. 107 To account for the possibility that 
strategic scheduling of liabilities might understate actual total liabilities, I created a 
second liability data set using the same 782 cases. Debtor liabilities in this second 
data set included all liabilities, whether contingent or not, and unliquidated or not 
("total liabilities"). Once again, debtors were categorized by liability range, using 
the three ranges described above. 
III. THE FINDINGS: COMMITTEE FORMATION, LIABILITY SIZE, 
AND PLAN SUCCESS 
A. Plan Confirmation as "Success" 
The debtor (or some other entity) 108 proposed a plan in 389 of the 798 
cases in the random sample, yielding a plan proposal rate of 49%. 109 The 
bankruptcy court confirmed a plan in 269 of these 3 89 cases, for a confirmation 
rate, once plan proposal occurred, of 69%. While that number "looks good," it is 
important to keep in mind that in more than half of the cases in the random sample, 
no plan was ever proposed. Thus, plan confirmation occurred in only 269 of the 
798 cases in the random sample, for an initial success rate of 34%. 110 If plan 
contingent or unliquidated debts. But, in 35 of these cases, the debtor's petition information 
identified the debtor as falling under the $2 million liability limit; therefore, while any 
deductions for contingent or unliquidated debt would have lowered the debtor's overall 
liabilities, it would not have changed the fact that the debtor's liabilities did not exceed $2 
million. In the remaining three cases, the debtor checked "more than $100 million" in 
liabilities on the petition. While it is possible that these debtors' schedules might identify 
$95 million or more of their liabilities as contingent or unliquidated, thereby changing their 
liability range, I assumed that such a radical decrease in liabilities was unlikely. 
106. Most, although not all, debtors filed Official Form B6, which provides 
summary data for the debtor's assets, both real and personal, as well as its liabilities, both 
secured and unsecured. The official bankruptcy forms are on the United States Courts' 
website. See supra note 69. 
107. See infra notes 131-35 and accompanying text. 
108. The Code provides the debtor that is not a small business with a 120-day 
exclusive period during which only it may propose a plan. II U.S.C. § 112l(b) (2012). In 
2004, debtors electing small business treatment had a 100-day exclusivity period. 11 
U.S.C.A. § 112l(e)(l) (2004). Small business debtors currently have a 180-day period 
during which they alone may propose a plan. II U.S.C. § 112l(e)(l) (2012). After the 
expiration of the debtor's exclusivity period, "any party in interest, including the debtor, the 
trustee, a creditors' committee, an equity security holders' committee, a creditor, an equity 
security holder, or an indenture trustee, may file a plan." Jd. § 112l(c). 
109. In Part III.B.2, the sample is comprised of782 cases. See infra notes 125-30 
and accompanying text for an explanation of the change in sample size. A plan was 
proposed in 388 of these 782 cases, for a plan proposal rate of approximately 50%. 
110. This figure is consistent with that found by Professors Warren and 
Westbrook in their 2009 published study of Chapter II cases. See Challenge, supra note 1, 
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confirmation is the measure of success, then almost two-thirds of the Chapter 11 
cases in the sample were not successful. 111 
The ultimate success rate is even lower. In 36 of the 269 cases with 
confirmed plans, the court either dismissed or converted the case, or the debtor re-
filed for bankruptcy post-confirmation. In total, 13% of the confirmed-plan cases 
failed. These plan failures lowered the ultimate success rate to 29%, from an initial 
success rate of 34%. 112 By this measure, then, more than 70% of the Chapter 11 
cases were not successful. 113 
This rough metric, however, masked important differences in success 
rates when committee formation and liability size were taken into account. 
B. Unequal Success Rates 
Chapter 11 debtors are not created equal in terms of their prospects for 
plan confirmation and performance. Formation of an official unsecured creditors' 
committee and the size of a debtor's liabilities significantly predict both initial and 
ultimate rates of success. 114 The effects on confirmation rates obtain regardless of 
whether liabilities include or exclude contingent and unliquidated debt. 
1. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors 
The Code provides that "the United States trustee shall appoint a 
committee of creditors holding unsecured claims."us The committee normally is 
at 615 (finding that even their "naive metric" of Chapter 11 success showed confirmation 
rates of30.3% and 33.4% for their 1994 and 2002 samples, respectively). 
Ill. The initial and ultimate success rates are comparable for the liability sample 
in Part III.B.2. Of 782 cases in that sample, the court confirmed a plan in 267 cases for an 
initial success rate of 34%. Thirty-six of those plans failed, leaving 231 ultimately 
successful cases out of 782 for an ultimate success rate of approximately 30%. 
112. There were 233 confirmed-plan cases after accounting for post-confirmation 
conversions and dismissals, as well as subsequent bankruptcy filings, out of a sample of798 
cases. 
113. The initial and ultimate success rates for the "individual consumer" Chapter 
II cases did not differ significantly from those for the "business" Chapter 11 cases. See 
supra note 67 and accompanying text. Of the 695 "business" Chapter II cases, 240 initially 
confirmed a plan, while 29 of the 103 "consumer" cases did so, for initial success rates of 
35% -and 28%, respectively. The difference in initial success rates is not statistically 
significant at the 0.05 significance level. Ultimate success rates are 30% (206 of 695 
"business" cases) and 26% (27 of 103 "consumer" cases), respectively, for business and 
consumer Chapter 11 cases. Once again, the difference in ultimate success rates is not 
statistically significant at the 0.05 significance level. 
114. I did not examine the effect of other committees, e.g., equity security 
holders, on plan confirmation rates. For an excellent empirical analysis of the impact of 
committees on Chapter 11 outcomes, see Michelle Hamer & Jamie Marincic, Committee 
Capture? An Empirical Analysis of the Role of Creditors' Committees in Business 
Reorganizations, 64 V AND. L. REv. 749 (20 II). 
115. 11 U.S.C. § 1102(a)(l) (2012). The United States Trustee does not have 
oversight responsibilities for the bankruptcy courts in the judicial districts of Alabama and 
North Carolina. Instead, bankruptcy administrators perform those functions. The figures 
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comprised of those creditors, willing to serve, that hold the seven largest unsecured 
claims against the debtor. 116 While the language of the Code is mandatory, stating 
that the United States Trustee "shall" appoint an unsecured creditors' committee, 
"creditors typically are unwilling to serve. " 117 In fact, a committee was formed in 
only 18% of the cases in the random sample. 118 The reason for such a low rate of 
committee formation is that in most cases an insufficient number of creditors were 
willing to serve. 119 
As Column B of Tables 1 and 2 illustrate, both the initial and ultimate 
success rates differ markedly for committee and no-committee cases. The initial 
success rate of 62.07% for cases with an official committee is more than twice as 
high as the initial success rate of 27.41% for no-committee cases (see Table 1, 
Column B). 120 The story is the same for ultimate success rates. For cases with a 
committee, the ultimate success rate of 55.17% is more than double the 23.43% 
success rate for no-committee cases (see Table 2, Column B). 121 
These differences in initial and ultimate success rates for committee and 
no-committee cases are statistically significant. The p-value in both cases is very 
quoted in the text, however, include committees formed in any case in the random sample, 
regardless of whether the United States Trustee made the appointment. 
116. !d. § 11 02(b )(1 ). 
11 7. Small, supra note 1, at 983. 
118. An official unsecured creditors' committee formed in 145 of the 798 cases 
(see Figure 1, Column I). The 145 cases consist of only those cases in which the docket--in 
the header or as a separate docket entry-or a case document, e.g., a disclosure statement, 
§ 341 meeting minutes, or a motion to dismiss or convert, affirmatively indicated the 
formation of a committee. In some jurisdictions, the United States Trustee placed on the 
docket a statement of inability to form a creditors' committee. But, in a number of 
jurisdictions there was no mention at all of either the formation or non-formation of an 
official committee. Given the important role that the official unsecured creditors' committee 
plays in a Chapter 11 case, I assumed that the failure to find any evidence of committee 
appointment on the docket or case documents meant that no committee was formed. 
119. See, e.g., Statement of United States Trustee Concerning Inability to Appoint 
an Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors at~ 2, In re Ocean Beach Transfer, No. 04-
08022 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. April 13, 2005) (Docket No. 41) (noting that notwithstanding 
efforts to appoint a committee, "sufficient indications of willingness to serve on a 
committee of unsecured creditors ha[ d) not been received from persons eligible to serve on 
such a committee"); Minutes of the 11 U.S.C. § 341 Meeting, In re Pixius Commc'ns, LLC, 
No. 04-16825 (Bankr. D. Kan. Jan. 14, 2005) (Docket No. 45) (stating that "an insufficient 
number of creditors ha[ d) expressed an interest in serving on a creditors' committee"). 
120. Initial success rates are computed by dividing the number of confirmed plans 
for each category-committee versus no-committee-by the total number of cases in that 
category. For example, 179 cases had confirmed plans out of 653 no-committee cases for an 
initial success rate of 27.41%. 
121. Ofthe 90 cases with a committee and a confirmed plan, 10 plans failed; thus, 
80 cases had successful plans out of the 145 cases with a committee. For no-committee 
cases, 179 cases had confirmed plans and 26 of those plans failed, leaving 153 cases with 
successful plans out of the 653 no-committee cases. 
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small-less than 0.001 (see Tables 1 and 2, Column C).122 This means that, for the 
random sample of all Chapter 11 debtors, formation of an official unsecured 
creditors' committee is associated with significantly greater odds of both plan 
confirmation and successful plan performance. 
But is committee formation associated with greater odds of plan 
performance among the sub-sample of confirmed-plan cases? Official creditors' 
committees normally disband after plan confirmation; therefore, they cannot serve 
an oversight function post-confirmation. Is it possible, however, that a committee's 
participation in plan negotiations positively affects the feasibility of any plan 
confirmed by the court, thereby influencing ultimate success rates for confirmed-
plan cases? The short answer is "no." The 88.89% success-on-confirmation rate 
for committee cases is only slightly higher than 85.47%, which is the rate for no-
committee cases (see Table 3, Column B). Column C of Table 3 shows that the 
p-value exceeds 0.05, which means that there is no statistically significant 
difference between the success-on-confirmation rates of cases with appointed 
committees and cases without such committees. 
In conclusion, while official unsecured creditors' committees existed in 
only a small minority of the Chapter 11 cases in the random sample, cases that had 
a committee confirmed and performed plans at a statistically significant higher rate 
than did cases without a creditors' committee. However, once a plan was 
confirmed, committee formation did not predict plan performance. Statistically, 
plan-performance rates for cases without committees were not significantly 
different from those for cases with committees. 
122. A p-value "usually expresses the probability that results at least as extreme 
as those obtained in a sample were due to chance." SARAH BosLAUGH & PAUL ANDREW 
WATTERS, STATISTICS IN A NUTSHELL 145 (2008). 
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Figure 1. Committees and Plan Confirmation 
Column I Column II Column III 
f1/llt Ultimate Success =153 
f1/llt Confirmed =179 -.; Ultimately not 
No Committee successfu1=26 
=653 
, -.; Not confirmed ~ Not successful =474 =474 
Cases=798 
f1/llt Ultimate Success 
' 
=80 
Confirmed f1/llt =90 
-.; Ultimately not Committee successful= I 0 
=145 
-.; Not confirmed ~ Not successful= 55 =55 
Table 1. Committees and Initial Success Rates 
A 8 c 
Total Number ofCases=798 Number Success Results Confirmed Percentage123 
No-committee cases=653 179 27.41% p<O.OOJ 
Statistically significant 
Committee cases=145 90 62.07% higher rate of confirmation for committee cases 
Table 2. Committees and Ultimate Success Rates 
A 8 c 
Total Number ofCases=798 Number Success Results Confirmed Percentage 
No-committee cases=653 153 23.43% p<O.OOJ 
Statistically significant 
Committee cases=145 80 55.17% higher rate of ultimate 
success for committee cases 
123. I use the term "success percentage" in Tables 1, 2, and 3 m lieu of the 
statistical term "sample proportion." 
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Table 3. Committees and Success-on-Confirmation Rates 
A B c 
Number of 
Total Number ofCases=269 Ultimately Success Results Successful Percentage 
Plans 
No-committee confirmed-plan 153 85.47% 
cases=179 p>0.05 
Committee confirmed-plan 80 88.89% 
No statistical difference 
cases=90 
2. Size of Debtor Liabilities 
To test the relationship between the size of a debtor's liabilities and plan 
confirmation rates, I obtained liability information from the debtor's schedules. 
Bankruptcy debtors must file schedules of assets and liabilities, the latter of which 
provide detail about a debtor's secured and unsecured debt. 124 In 54 cases, 
however, the debtor either filed no schedules, which then precipitated the debtor's 
dismissal from bankruptcy,125 or I was unable to access the schedules on PACER 
or otherwise obtain them. 126 I then turned to other documents in the case, including 
two important pieces of information on the petition. 
The petition requires the debtor to check a box indicating the range of its 
liabilities, which in 2004 ranged from a low of "$0 to $50,000," to a high of 
"[m]ore than $100 million."127 In 2004, the petition also provided a debtor with the 
option of identifyinr itself as a small business debtor and/or electing small 
business treatment. 12 In 38 of the 54 no-schedule cases, I was able to isolate the 
liability range to which the debtor belonged by using other information filed in the 
124. See 11 U.S.C. § 52l(a)(1)(B)(i) (2012) (stating that the "debtor shall 
file ... unless the court orders otherwise-a schedule of assets and liabilities"). 
125. See, e.g., Ex Parte Order Dismissing Case for Failure to Timely File 
Schedules, Statements, or Lists, in re Kostick, No. 04-42968 (Bankr. W.O. Wash. Aprill9, 
2004) (Docket No. 11). 
126. See, e.g., In re Slade's of West Virginia, Inc., No. 04-00393 (Bankr. W.D. 
Va. March 3, 2004). In the fall of2011, I twice made contact with the bankruptcy court for 
the Western District of Virginia. On both occasions court personnel informed me that they 
could not access case documents from 2004 due to building renovations occurring at the 
court. I deleted two of the six cases in the random sample drawn from the Western District 
of Virginia because I could not obtain reliable liability information in either case. 
127. Currently, the petition's high-end range is "[m]ore than $1 billion." See U.S. 
COURTS BANKR. FORMS, VOLUNTARY PETITION (2011), Official Form 1. Official forms are 
available at the website for the United States Courts, see supra note 69. 
128. Congress eliminated the small business election in 2005. Compare 11 
U.S.C.A. § 112l(e) (2004) (providing plan exclusivity and proposal rules for cases "in 
which the debtor is a small business and elects to be considered a small business"), with 11 
U.S.C. § 1121(e) (2012) (providing plan exclusivity and proposal rules for "small business 
case[s]"). The voluntary petition now requires the debtor to check that it either is or is not a 
small business debtor. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1020(a) (stating that in a voluntary case a 
Chapter 11 debtor "shall state in the petition whether the debtor is a small business debtor"). 
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debtor's case. 129 In the remaining 16 cases, however, I was unable to do so. I 
eliminated these 16 cases, which comprised 2% of the original 798-case sample, 
thereby leaving 782 cases in the debtor liability sample. 
In the process of coding cases, I noticed that some debtors listed a 
significant portion of their debt as contingent or unliquidated. 130 There is a 
strategic reason why a debtor may do so in a Chapter 11 case. 131 The Federal Rules 
of Bankruptcy Procedure provide that in a Chapter 11 case, the debtor's scheduled 
liabilities "constitute prima facie evidence of the validity and amount of the claims 
of creditors unless they are scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated. " 132 
Creditors whose claims are scheduled but not identified as disputed, contingent, or 
unliquidated need not file a proof of claim in the debtor's bankruptcy case. 133 For 
example, scheduling a creditor's claim but listing it as contingent or unliquidated 
forces the creditor to file a proof of claim or risk losing the right to be "treated as a 
creditor with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting [on] and distribution" 
under the debtor's plan. 134 
To account for the possibility that strategic scheduling of liabilities might 
understate actual total liabilities, the liability data were tested twice-once using 
the debtor's NCL liabilities and again using the debtor's total liabilities. In Part 
III.B.2.a below, I present the results of testing the liability data using the Code's $2 
million liability cutoff in 2004. Part III.B.2.b provides the results of testing the 
liability data against the Commission's recommended $5 million liability limit. 
129. In the vast majority of these 38 cases, I categorized the debtor based solely 
on the liability box checked on the petition. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, In re Highsmith-
Harris, No. 04-35079 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Nov. 8, 2004) (Docket No. I) (estimated debts listed 
as $50,001 to $100,000); Voluntary Petition, In re Rose Manor Props., Inc., No. 04-62639 
(Bankr. D. Or. April4, 2004) (estimated debts of"More than $100 million"). In three cases, 
the debtor checked the $1-10 million box, but also identified itself on the petition as a small 
business debtor. See, e.g., Voluntary Petition, In re Body Tech Park City, Inc., No. 04-
36156 (Bankr. D. Utah Oct. 5, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (checking $1-10 million liability range 
but checking "Debtor is a small business defined in 11 U.S.C. § 101"). In 2004, a debtor 
with more than $2 million in liabilities did not qualify as a small business debtor. Hence, a 
debtor that checked either of the "small business" boxes on the voluntary petition should 
have had no more than $2 million in aggregate liabilities. 
130. See, e.g., Schedules, In re Mark Edgil & Associates, Inc., No. 04-85645 
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Dec. 30, 2004) (Docket No. 17) (listing all liabilities as unliquidated); 
Schedules A-H, In re Tri Axle, No. 04-3315 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. October 20, 2004) (Docket 
No. 18) (listing all unsecured debt, both priority and general, as contingent, unliquidated, 
and disputed); see also Corporate Debtors' Schedules, supra note 80 (listing approximately 
94% of unsecured priority debt as contingent and unliquidated). 
131. For a discussion of Chapter 11 debtor strategy in scheduling liabilities, see 
Anne M. Lawton & Lynda J. Oswald, Scary Stories and the Limited Liability Polluter in 
Chapter 11, 65 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 451, 521 (2008). Of course, under-reporting of 
liabilities post-BAPCPA may subject the debtor to treatment as a small business debtor. 
132. FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(b)(1). 
133. !d. at 3003(c)(2). 
134. !d. 
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Finally, in Part III.B.2.c, I present the results of multiple comparison testing across 
the three liability ranges: (1) ~$2 million; (2) $2 to $5 million; and (3) >$5 million. 
a. Success Rates Using the $2 Million Liability Limit 
i. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities 
Debtors with more than $2 million in NCL liabilities comprised only 29% 
of the cases in the adjusted random sample. 135 Nonetheless, they accounted for 
more than 40% of the cases in which the debtor confirmed and successfully 
performed a plan. 136 
A comparison of Columns A and B of Table 4 reveals a marked 
difference in the initial and ultimate success rates for debtors above and below the 
$2 million liability cutoff. In addition, the p-values in Column C for both initial 
and ultimate success rates are small-less than 0.001. Therefore, debtors with 
NCL liabilities in excess of $2 million have initial and ultimate success rates that 
are significantly higher statistically than debtors whose liabilities are $2 million or 
less. I offer explanations for why this might be the case in the following Section. 
As with the committee data, liability size did not significantly predict 
success-on-confirmation rates. Columns A and B of Table 4 show a success-on-
confirmation rate of 84.28% for debtors with ~$2 million in NCL liabilities 
compared with a rate of 89.81% for debtors whose NCL liabilities exceed $2 
million. The p-value in Column C is greater than 0.05, which means that for 
confirmed-plan cases, the size of the debtor's NCL liabilities is not associated with 
greater odds that the debtor's plan will succeed. 
135. Of the 782 cases in the liability sample, 224 had NCL liabilities in excess of 
$2 million (see Figure 2, Column I). 
136. Two cases with confirmed plans were removed with the elimination ofthe 16 
cases discussed supra at notes 125-30 and accompanying text. Of the 267 cases with 
confirmed plans, 40.45% or 108 had NCL liabilities in excess of $2 million (see Figure 2, 
Column II). Of the 231 cases with ultimately successful plans, 97 or 41.99% had NCL 
liabilities over $2 million (see Figure 2, Column III). 
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Figure 2. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities at the $2 Million Limit and 
Plan Confirmation 
Column I Column II Column III 
filii Ultimate Success =134 
filii Confirmed =159 ..._ Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful=25 
::0$2M=558 
, .... Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful =399 =399 
Cases=782 
filii Ultimate Success 
' 
Confirmed 
=97 
.,If =108 ..._ Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful= 11 
>$2M=224 
..._ 
Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful =116 =116 
Table 4. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities at the $2 Million Limit 
A B c 
NCL ::;$2M NCL>$2M Results 
Initial Success 159/558=28.49% 108/224=48.21% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate 
of initial success for NCL >$2M 
Ultimate Success 134/558=24.01% 97/224=43.30% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate 
of ultimate success for NCL >$2M 
Success on 134/159=84.28% 97/108=89.81% p>0.05 
Confirmation 
Total Cases=267 No statistical difference in 
success-on-confirmation rates 
n. Total Liabilities 
Counting contingent and unliquidated debts in the liability figures 
reduced by 30 the number of debtors with :S$2 million in liabilities and increased 
by 30 the number of debtors with liabilities in excess of $2 million (see Figure 3, 
Column 1). Debtors with total liabilities in excess of $2 million comprised only 
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32% of the adjusted random sample, 137 but accounted for 46% of the initially 
confirmed plans and 49% of the successfully performed plans. 138 
Columns A and B of Table 5 reveal a considerable difference in both 
initial and ultimate success rates for debtors with total liabilities above and below 
$2 million. The results of the statistical analysis, provided in Column C, 
demonstrate that debtors with total liabilities in excess of $2 million have both 
initial and ultimate success rates that are significantly different statistically from 
debtors with total liabilities of $2 million or less. 
The pattern seen for NCL liabilities and success-on-confirmation rates, 
however, did not hold for total liabilities. Debtors with total liabilities in excess of 
$2 million have significantly higher success-on-confirmation rates than do debtors 
with :S$2 million in total liabilities (see Table 5, Column C). Why might this be the 
case? One explanation may be that liability size serves as a proxy for financial 
sophistication. Mom-and-pop enterprises or other small businesses are unlikely to 
have access to multi-million-dollar lines of credit while trade creditors are equally 
unlikely to allow debtors with fewer resources to maintain high unsecured credit 
balances. By comparison, debtors with significant liabilities likely have significant 
assets-banks and other lenders do not lend to borrowers without collateral. As the 
Commission noted in its report, "the nature and size of the debtor's liabilities is the 
single best predictor of case complexity." 139 A complex case usually involves a 
debtor with a more elaborate business structure. Such debtors may have access to 
legal, accounting, and financial expertise. This expertise, in tum, may result in 
confirmation of a "better" or more feasible plan. 
However, a cautionary note is in order. This finding of a statistically 
significant difference in success-on-confirmation rates for large-versus small-
liability debtors does not hold for any other liability measure. It is unclear why that 
should be the case. If, for example, liability size serves as a proxy for financial 
sophistication, then success-on-confirmation rates for firms with liabilities in 
excess of $5 million should be significantly different than those with liabilities of 
$5 million or less. But that is not the case. 140 Of course, the "proxy" argument is 
only one explanation for this success-on-confirmation finding. Nonetheless, other 
possible explanations, e.g., greater creditor commitment to plan success in larger 
cases, also would produce statistically different success-on-confirmation rates for 
debtors with liabilities in excess of $5 million. 
137. Of the 782 cases in the liability sample, 254 had total liabilities in excess of 
$2 million (see Figure 3, Column I). 
138. Of the 267 cases with confirmed plans, 124 or 46.44% had total liabilities in 
excess of $2 million (see Figure 3, Column II). Of the 231 successful plans, 113 or 48.92% 
were filed by debtors with more than $2 million in total liabilities (see Figure 3, Column 
III). 
139. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 630 (footnote omitted). 
140. See infra Part Ili.B.2.b. 
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Figure 3. Total Liabilities at the $2 Million Limit and Plan Confirmation 
Column I Column II Column III 
--
Ultimate Success 
=118 
--
Confirmed 
=143 ..._ 
Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful=25 
:S$2M=528 
, ..._ Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful =385 =385 
Cases=782 
f1/llf Ultimate Success 
' 
=113 
--
Confirmed 
= 124 
..._ 
Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful= II 
>$2M=254 
..._ 
Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful =130 =130 
Table 5. Total Liabilities at the $2 Million Limit 
A B c 
Total Total Liabilities Results Liabilities :::S2M >$2M 
Initial Success 143/528=27.08% 124/254=48.82% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate 
of initial success when 
total liabilities >$2M 
Ultimate Success 118/528=22.35% 113/254=44.49% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate 
of ultimate success when 
total liabilities >$2M 
Success on 118/143=82.52% 113/124=91.13% p<0.05 
Confirmation 
Total Cases=267 Statistically significant higher rate 
of success on confirmation when 
total liabilities >$2M 
111. Summary of Findings: $2 Million Limit 
Congress and the Commission were correct: Chapter 11 is problematic for 
the small debtor. It is unclear why Congress chose $2 million as the liability cutoff. 
Nonetheless, that choice was correct: Debtors with more than $2 million in 
liabilities confirm and successfully perform plans at significantly higher rates than 
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do debtors with liabilities of $2 million or less. These findings obtain regardless of 
whether debtors' liabilities include or exclude contingent and unliquidated debt. 
The nature of a debtor's liabilities does matter, however, when evaluating 
success-on-confirmation rates. There is no statistical difference in success-on-
confirmation rates when using NCL liabilities. Debtors with total liabilities in 
excess of $2 million, however, have significantly higher rates of success on 
confirmation compared with debtors having total liabilities of $2 million or less. 
The reason for the latter finding, given the study's other results, is unclear. 
b. Success Rates Using the $5 Million Liability Limit 
1. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities 
Debtors with NCL liabilities in excess of $5 million comprised only 16% 
of the cases in the adjusted 782-case random sample. 141 Nonetheless, they 
accounted for a quarter of confirmed and also ultimately successful plans. 142 
The pattern of initial and ultimate success rates for debtors with NCL 
liabilities above and below $5 million is similar to that seen for debtors with NCL 
liabilities above and below $2 million. The initial and ultimate success rates for 
debtors with NCL liabilities over $5 million are strikingly higher than comparable 
rates for debtors with NCL liabilities of $5 million or less (compare Column A 
with Column B of Table 6). In addition, as Column C of Table 6 shows, the 
p-values for both the initial and ultimate-success rate data are small-less than 
0.001. Thus, debtors with NCL liabilities in excess of $5 million confirm and 
successfully perform plans at a significantly higher rate statistically than do 
debtors whose liabilities are $5 million or less. 
A comparison of Columns A and B of Table 6 reveals very similar rates 
of success on confirmation. As Column C illustrates, there is no statistically 
significant difference between the success-on-confirmation rate for debtors whose 
NCL liabilities exceed $5 million and those whose NCL liabilities are $5 million 
or less. Thus, for those debtors that confirm a plan, liability size is not significantly 
associated with plan performance. 
ii. Total Liabilities 
Debtors with total liabilities in excess of $5 million comprised less than 
20% of the adjusted random sample but accounted for 31% of the initially 
confirmed and 32% of successfully performed plans. 143 Thus, debtors with total 
141. Of the 782 cases in the liability sample, 128 had NCL liabilities in excess of 
$5 million (see Figure 4, Column I). 
142. Of the 267 cases with confirmed plans, the debtor had NCL liabilities in 
excess of $5 million in 68 or 25.47% of the confirmed-plan cases (see Figure 4, Column II). 
Of the 231 cases with successful plans, 60 or 25.97% had NCL liabilities over $5 million 
(see Figure 4, Column III). 
143. Of 782 cases in the adjusted random sample, 151 or 19.31% had total 
liabilities over $5 million (see Figure 5, Column I). Of 267 cases with confirmed plans, 83 
or 31.09% had total liabilities in excess of $5 million (see Figure 5, Column II). Finally, of 
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liabilities in excess of $5 million were disproportionately represented in the group 
of cases with confirmed and successfully performed plans. 
A closer examination of the data reveals a marked difference in both the 
initial and ultimate success rates for debtors with total liabilities above and below 
$5 million (compare Column A with Column B of Table 7). In addition, the results 
of the statistical analysis, provided in Column C, demonstrate that debtors with 
total liabilities in excess of $5 million have both initial and ultimate success rates 
that are significantly different statistically from debtors whose total liabilities are 
$5 million or less. 
Once again, however, the success-on-confirmation rates are similar for 
debtors with total liabilities above and below $5 million. As Column C illustrates, 
there is no statistically significant difference between the success-on-confirmation 
rate for debtors whose total liabilities exceed $5 million and those whose total 
liabilities are $5 million or less. 
iii. Summary of Findings: $5 Million Limit 
The findings support the Commission's decision to draw the liability 
cutoff at $5 million. Debtors with liabilities in excess of $5 million confirm and 
perform plans at significantly greater rates than do debtors with liabilities of $5 
million or less. This finding holds regardless of whether debtors' liabilities include 
or exclude contingent and unliquidated debt. But there is no statistical difference in 
success-on-confirmation rates between debtors with liabilities above and below $5 
million, regardless of whether the analysis is conducted using NCL or total 
liabilities. Thus, there is no statistically significant difference in plan performance 
rates between confirmed-plan cases with liabilities above $5 million and 
confirmed-plan cases with liabilities of $5 million or less. 
231 ultimately successful cases, 32.47% or 75 cases had more than $5 million in total 
liabilities (see Figure 5, Column Ill). 
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Figure 4. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities at the $5 Million Limit and 
Plan Confirmation 
Column I Column II Column III 
--
Ultimate Success 
=171 
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Confirmed 
=199 ~ Ultimately not Liabilities successful=28 
~$5M=654 
, ~ Not confirmed 
..art Not successful =455 =455 
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Table 6. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities at the $5 Million Limit 
A 8 c 
NCL~$SM NCL>$SM Results 
Initial Success 199/654=30.43% 68/128=53.13% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate of 
initial success when NCL >$5M 
Ultimate Success 171/654=26.15% 60/128=46.88% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate of 
ultimate success when NCL >$5M 
Success on 1711199=85.93% 60/68=88 .24% p>0.05 
Confirmation 
Total Cuses=267 No statistical difference in 
success-on-confirmation rates 
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Table 7. Total Liabilities at the $5 Million Limit 
A B c 
Total Total Results Liabilities :::SSM Liabilities >$5M 
Initial Success 184/631=29.16% 83/151=54.97% p<O.OOI 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate of 
initial success when total liabilities 
>$5M 
Ultimate Success 156/631 =24. 72% 75/151=49.67% p<O.OOJ 
Total Cases=782 
Statistically significant higher rate of 
ultimate success when total liabilities 
>$5M 
Success on 156/184=84.78% 75/83=90.36% p>0.05 
Confirmation 
Total Cases=267 No statistical difference in 
success-on-confirmation rates 
Figure 5. Total Liabilities at the $5 Million Limit and Plan Confirmation 
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c. Where to Draw the Line--$2 or $5 Million? 
As the earlier analysis demonstrates, debtors with more than $2 million in 
liabilities have initial and ultimate success rates that are significantly higher 
statistically than debtors with :S$2 million in liabilities. But, debtors with $5 
million or more in liabilities also have initial and ultimate success rates that are 
significantly higher statistically than debtors with $5 million or less in liabilities. 
Therefore, at what liability range does the difference in success rates become 
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statistically significant? Making that determination requires a comparison of 
success rates across the following three pairs ofliability ranges: 
1) :5$2 million with $2 to $5 million 
2) $2 to $5 miltion with >$5 million 
3) :5$2 million with >$5 million 
1. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities 
A comparison of Columns A, B, and C of Table 8 shows that both initial 
and ultimate success rates increase as the NCL liability range changes from :5$2 
million, to $2 to $5 million, to >$5 million. Figure 7 graphically demonstrates the 
same point. 
Columns D-F of Table 8 provide the results of performing multiple 
comparisons among the three liability ranges. Columns D and F show that there is 
a statistically significant difference in initial and ultimate success rates for two 
pairs ofliability range comparisons: 
1) :5$2 million of NCL liabilities compared with NCL 
liabilities between $2 and $5 million (Column D); and 
2) :S$2 million of NCL liabilities compared with >$5 
million in NCL liabilities (Column F). 
However, perhaps more important, is the finding shown in Column E. 
There is no statistically significant difference in initial or ultimate success rates for 
debtors with $2 to $5 million in NCL liabilities and those with >$5 million in such 
liabilities. Thus, differences in the rate of both initial and ultimate success become 
significant at the $2 million threshold. At least for cases filed in 2004, the Code's 
$2 million liability limit, not the Commission's limit of $5 million, more 
accurately identifies those debtors with significantly weaker prospects for plan 
confirmation and performance in Chapter 11. 
What about success-on-confirmation rates? Columns D-F of Table 8 
show that among any of the three pairs of liability range comparisons, there is no 
statistically significant difference in ultimate success once a plan is confirmed. 
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Figure 6. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities and Success Across Three 
Liability Ranges 
Column I Column II Column III 
--
Ultimate Success 
=134 
--
Confirmed 
=159 ..._ 
Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful=25 
:S$2M=558 
.... Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful =399 =399 
--
Ultimate Success 
=37 
Confirmed 
--
=40 §]-+ Liabilities ..._ Ultimately not >$2M but successful=3 2 :S$5M=96 
.... Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful=56 =56 
--
Ultimate Success 
=60 Confirmed 
--
=68 
..._ Ultimately not 
Liabilities successful=8 
>$5M=l28 
.... Not confirmed 
-+ Not successful=60 =60 
2012] CHAPTER 11 TRIAGE 1021 
Table 8. Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities-$2 Million or $5 Million 
Limit? 
Multiple Comparison Results144 
A B c D E F 
:5$2M $2-SM >$5M :5$2M with $2-5M with :5$2M with 
$2-5M >$5M >$5M 
Initial Success 159/558= 40/96= 68/128= p<0.05 p>0.05 p<O.OOJ 
28.49% 41.67% 53.13% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
differ do not differ differ 
Ultimate 134/558= 37/96= 60/128= p<0.05 p>0.05 p<O.OOJ 
Success 24.01% 38.54% 46.88% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
differ do not differ differ 
Success on 134/159= 37/40= 60/68= p>0.05 p>0.05 p>0.05 
Confirmation 84.28% 92.50% 88.24% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
do not differ do not differ do not differ 
Figure 7. Success Rates: Non-Contingent, Liquidated Liabilities 
100.00% ,--- .... _,, ______ .... __________________________________________________ .. ____ ............ .. 
90.00% 
80.00% 
70.00C?/o ! 60.00% 
~ 50.00~>'0 
" a 
38.54% 
u. Total Liabilities 
A look at Columns A-C of Table 9 shows that as the total liability range 
increases, so do the initial and ultimate success rates. Figure 9 makes the same 
point graphically. As with NCL liabilities, success-on-confirmation rates increase 
only when moving from ::;$2 million in total liabilities to the $2 to $5 million range 
of total liabilities. 
The multiple comparison results, provided in Columns D-F of Table 9, 
paint a somewhat different picture for total liabilities compared with NCL 
144. The test statistics were computed using the Bonferroni Correction. The 
reason for doing the Bonferroni Correction is to ensure that Type I errors-stating that there 
is a statistically significant result when none exists-are not increased to a level past 0.05. 
See ANDY FIELD, DISCOVERING STATISTICS USING SPSS 565 (3d ed. 2009). 
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liabilities. For initial success rates, there is a statistically significant difference 
among all three pairs of liability ranges. In other words, for total liabilities, the $2 
million and the $5 million liability cutoffs are equally sound for predicting when 
plan confirmation rates become statistically significant. 
As with NCL liabilities, however, there is a statistically significant 
difference in ultimate success rates for two pairs ofliability range comparisons: 
1) ~$2 million of total liabilities compared with total 
liabilities between $2 and $5 million (Column D); and 
2) ~$2 million of total liabilities compared with total 
liabilities in excess of $5 million (Column F). 
But as the finding in Column E, Table 9, demonstrates, there is no 
statistical difference in ultimate success rates between debtors with $2 to $5 
million in total liabilities and debtors with >$5 million in total liabilities. Thus, 
differences in the rates of ultimate success become significant at the $2 million 
liability limit. 
The results for success-on-confirmation rates are the same for both NCL 
and total liabilities. As Columns D-F of Table 9 show, once a plan is confirmed 
there is no statistically significant difference in ultimate success among any of the 
three pairs ofliability range comparisons. 
What do these findings on total liability mean, then? The plan 
confirmation findings do not support Congress' choice of the $2 million liability 
limit over the Commission's $5 million cutoff. But plan performance is really a 
more realistic measure of Chapter 11 success. After all, the point of Chapter 11 is 
not to simply confirm a plan; it is to successfully perform that plan. Thus, the fact 
that the difference in ultimate success rates becomes significant at $2 million 
suggests that Congress, rather than the Commission, selected the better liability 
limit in its definition of a small Chapter 11 debtor. 
iii. Summary of Findings: Multiple Comparisons 
More than two-thirds of the debtors in the random sample had ~$2 
million in liabilities, regardless of whether those liabilities included or excluded 
contingent and unliquidated debt. 145 Yet, debtors that fell into this liability range 
had the weakest prospects for confirming and successfully performing a plan. 
Both Congress and the Commission operated on the assumption that 
debtors with larger liabilities have better prospects for success in Chapter 11. This 
study provides support for that assumption. At the same time, the study's results 
suggest that, in general, Congress selected a liability limit that better captures the 
group of debtors for which success in Chapter 11 is particularly elusive. 
145. Of782 debtors, 558 or 71.36% had ~$2 million in NCL liabilities (see Figure 
6, Column 1). Of 782 debtors, 528 or 67.52% had :5:$2 million in total liabilities (see Figure 
8, Column 1). Interestingly enough, the Commission predicted that "a liabilities-based 
definition of $2,000,000 or less would capture approximately 72% of all Chapter 11 cases 
filed." CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 630. 
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Figure 8. Total Liabilities and Success Across Three Liability Ranges 
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Table 9. Total Liabilities-$2 Million or $5 Million Limit? 
Multiple Comparison Results146 
A B c D E F 
:=;$2M $2-5M >$5M ::;$2M with $2-5M with ::;$2M with 
$2-5M >$5M >$5M 
Initial Success 143/528= 41/103= 83/151= p<0.05 p<0.05 p<0.001 
27.08% 39.81% 54.97% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
differ differ differ 
Ultimate 118/528= 38/103= 75/151 = p<O.Ol p>0.05 p<O.OOl 
Success 22.35% 36.89% 49.67% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
differ do not differ differ 
Success on 118/143= 38/41= 75/83= p>0.05 p>0.05 p>0.05 
Confirmation 82.52% 92.68% 90.36% Success rates Success rates Success rates 
do not differ do not differ do not differ 
Figure 9. Success Rates: Total Liabilities 
CONCLUSION: LESSONS AND LIMITATIONS 
Congress and the Commission were right: Overall rates of plan success in 
Chapter 11 are low, and those low rates are largely attributable to the small debtor. 
Congress, however, did a better job than the Commission at determining the 
criteria for identifying debtors with low prospects for success, although the 
legislative history suggests that happenstance, not perspicacity, accounts for the 
result. 
Committee formation-present in the Code's small business debtor 
definition but absent in the Commission's definition-was significantly associated 
with increased rates of plan confirmation and successful plan performance. 
Debtors with larger aggregate liabilities-whether those liabilities exceeded the 
146. See supra note 144 for an explanation of the Bonferroni Correction. 
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Code's $2 million limit or the Commission's $5 million cutoff-confirmed and 
successfully performed plans at rates that were significantly higher statistically 
than debtors with smaller aggregate liabilities. But Congress' $2 million cutoff for 
NCL liabilities better predicted the point at which plan confirmation and 
performance rates became significant. For total liabilities, that same cutoff also 
was a better predictor than the Commission's $5 million limit of successful plan 
performance. 
Committee formation and debtor liability size each independently 
predicted plan success in Chapter 11. For example, while there was a substantial 
overlap between those cases with committees and those with aggregate NCL 
liabilities in excess of $2 million, in more than a third of the cases with an official 
committee the debtor had :S$2 million in NCL liabilities. 147 Thus, this study 
provides a beginning toward understanding the predictors of plan success in 
Chapter 11. But there are three issues that require further research. 
First, the findings in this Article do not necessarily prove that committee 
formation or debtor liability size cause higher rates of plan success in Chapter 11. 
Take committee formation as an example. It is possible that participation of 
unsecured creditors through the vehicle of a strong committee pushes the debtor 
toward the path of plan confirmation. But, it is also possible that committee 
formation operates as nothing more than a positive signal of creditors' ex ante 
evaluation of the likelihood of debtor success in Chapter 11. If the latter is true, 
and plan confirmation is the goal, then encouraging committee formation or 
attempting to replicate the role that a committee plays in a Chapter 11 case is a 
waste of time. Thus, understanding why committee formation is associated with 
higher rates of plan confirmation and performance requires an initial determination 
of whether a causal link exists between committee formation and increased rates of 
plan success in Chapter 11. 
The same is true for debtor liability size. The Commission recommended 
a streamlined plan confirmation process after concluding that Chapter 11 itself 
accounted for some of the failures of small debtors to reorganize. 148 The concern 
was that the costs associated with Chapter 11 derailed small debtors, some of 
which might have been able to reorganize if there had been an expedited and less 
costly process. Thus, one explanation for the study's findings on liability size is 
that debtors with larger liabilities are better able to absorb the costs associated with 
the Chapter 11 process. But, what if debtor liability size affects plan confirmation 
rates regardless of the costs of Chapter 11? In other words, if it is the debtors and 
not some deficiency in the process that cause low confirmation rates, then 
tinkering with the process will not improve success rates in Chapter 11. 
147. Of the 143 cases with committees, 49 had :S$2 million in NCL liabilities. I 
use 143, not 145, cases here, because the sample is of cases with committees and 
measurable liabilities. If total liabilities are used, a committee formed in 39 of the cases with 
:S$2 million in total liabilities. 
148. COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 614. 
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Second, the findings in this Article are not an endorsement of the Code's 
current definition of a small business debtor. The findings do demonstrate that 
committee formation and debtor liability size are both independently associated 
with greater odds of plan success in Chapter 11. But both Congress and the 
Commission were wrong in requiring the subtraction of contingent and 
unliquidated debts from debtor liability totals. Liability totals, regardless of the 
inclusion or exclusion of contingent and unliquidated debts, predicted plan success 
in Chapter 11. This latter finding is significant, because there is no easy way, given 
current debtor reporting requirements, to obtain the total of a debtor's NCL 
liabilities. A similar problem arises with other elements of the Code's definition 
that are not examined in this study. 149 Affiliate and insider debts provide an 
example of the problem. 
Suppose Acme Corporation files for relief under Chapter 11 and 
schedules total liabilities of$2.45 million. It lists a debt of$117,000 as owed to the 
corporate president, who is an insider. 150 If the insider debt is deducted, then 
Acme's liabilities total $2,333,000, an amount that is $10,000 less than the current 
small business liability limit. 151 If the insider debt is not deducted, then Acme is 
not a small business debtor. Suppose Acme checks the box on the petition stating 
that it is not a small business debtor. 152 The United States Trustee (or any creditor) 
may object to Acme's designation, but the United States Trustee then must 
determine whether Acme "fit[ s] the criteria to be classified as a small business 
149. A similar problem exists in determining those debtors "whose primary 
activity is the business of owning or operating real property or activities incidental thereto." 
11 U.S.C. § 101(51D) (2012). The Code defines the term "single asset real estate" or 
"SARE", but it does not define what constitutes the "primary activity" of owning or 
operating real property. Question 18(b) of the Statement of Financial Affairs requires 
debtors to identify any business that qualifies as single asset real estate. See U.S. COURTS 
BANKR. FORMS, STATEMENT OF FINANCIAL AFFAIRS at 18(b) (2010), reprinted in 2011 
COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, Part 2: Bankruptcy Rules F-59 (2011). Yet, there is no 
"primary activity" counterpart to the SARE question on the Statement of Financial Affairs. 
While there is an overlap between the categories of "single asset real estate" and "primary 
activity," the latter term appears broader in scope. Therefore, is "primary activity" status 
determined by how the debtor describes itself? By the amount of time the debtor devotes to 
the activity? By the percentage of income derived from the activity? See, e.g., In re Gary 
Newton, No. 04-53451 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. May 27, 2004) (debtor operates a chiropractic 
clinic but derives 65% of his monthly income from rental properties). The Commission 
avoided this problem by sticking with the defined term "single asset real estate debtor" in its 
small debtor definition. See CoMMISSION REPORT, supra note 2, at 618. 
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(3l)(B)(ii) (defining an insider of a corporation to 
include a corporate officer). 
151. The current liability limit now stands at $2.343 million. See id. § 101(51D). 
152. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1020(a); U.S. COURTS BANKR. FORMS, VOLUNTARY 
PETITION (2011), reprinted in 2011 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, Part 2: Bankruptcy Rules 
F-1 (2011). If the debtor is a small business debtor, then it also should check a box 
indicating that its non-contingent liquidated debts are less than the statutory liability limit. 
See id. 
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case."
153 Herein lies the problem. Liability totals on the Summary of Schedules are 
based on all liabilities-contingent and non-contingent, liquidated and 
unliquidated, affiliate and non-affiliate, insider and non-insider. The debtor does 
not complete any document that separately itemizes affiliate, insider, contingent, 
and unliquidated debt. Must analysts in the Office of the United States Trustee 
("OUST") calculate revised liability totals after checking each page of the debtor's 
schedules for affiliate or insider debt? 154 
This seems like an enormous waste of resources, especially given the 
additional oversight responsibilities required of the OUST by BAPCPA' s 
reforms. 155 Moreover, these kinds of statutory filters, which are difficult to apply, 
undermine the goal of early identification of those debtors subject to the Code's 
small business provisions. 156 Additional research will help determine whether 
Congress was right in requiring deduction of affiliate and insider debt when 
computing debtor liabilities. This subsequent research should take account of 
current OUST practice. It is quite possible that staff in the OUST already use a 
simpler measure of liabilities-totals on the Summary of Schedules-not the 
Code's more complex liability measure. They may do so because the Code's 
method of calculating liabilities is not feasible, given the current level· of debtor 
disclosure that Chapter 11 requires. Of course, a simpler metric may miss some 
debtors that otherwise might qualify as small businesses. On the other hand, 
153. UNITED STATES DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES TRUSTEE PROGRAM FISCAL 
YEAR 2009 BUDGET REQUEST 6 (2008) (hereinafter UST BUDGET REQUEST]. 
154. Exacerbating the problem is poor disclosure by debtors of affiliates and 
insiders. For example, the Code's definition of an affiliate includes an entity owning 20% or 
more of the debtor's voting securities. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(2)(A) (2012). Yet, some 
corporate debtors in the random sample filed disclosures stating that the corporation had no 
equity security holders. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs Q. 21 b, In re Tri-Axle, Inc., 
No. 04-33515 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Oct. 20, 2004) (Docket No. 22) (checking "none" for 
question asking for the names of all shareholders with 5% or more of the debtor's voting or 
equity securities). Others simply made inconsistent filings in the Chapter 11 case. Compare 
List of Equity Security Holders, In re Tiger Steel Constr. Inc., No 04-50338 (Bankr. N.D. 
Fla. April 12, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (stating "none"), with Statement of Financial Affairs Q. 
21b, In re Tiger Steel Constr. Inc., No 04-50338 (Bankr. N.D. Fla. April12, 2004) (Docket 
No. 1) (listing Michael Crutchfield as holding "100% of all stock"). The emergence of new 
entity forms, such as limited liability companies, not included in the Code's definitional 
sections, further complicates the disclosure process. Compare List of Equity Security 
Holders, In re Home Acad. Child Care Center LLC, No. 04-44341 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 
2004) (Docket No. 1) (stating "none"), with Statement of Financial Affairs Q. 2lb, In re 
Home Acad. Child Care Center LLC, No. 04-44341 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Oct. 4, 2004) 
(Docket No. 1) (checking "none" for question asking for the names of all shareholders with 
5% or more of the debtor's voting or equity securities). 
155. See UST BUDGET REQUEST, supra note 153, at 5 (stating that the OUST's 
"responsibilities in terms of implementing the provisions of BAPCP A have grown 
significantly" and that the "workload associated with the new provisions [has] increased 
significantly"). 
156. See U.S. COURTS BANKR. FORMS, VOLUNTARY PETITION COMMITTEE NOTES 2 
(20 11 ), reprinted in 2011 COLLIER PAMPHLET EDITION, Part 2: Bankruptcy Rules F -11 
(2011) (stating that it is "desirable to identify eligible debtors at the outset of the case"). 
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complex rules spawn confusion and increase cost. Thus, as scholars continue to 
evaluate BAPCPA's reforms, it is important to consider the trade-offs between 
precision and confusion, accuracy and cost. 
Consideration of trade-offs raises the final issue for further investigation. 
What degree of success is enough to warrant the increased costs of oversight and 
reporting mandated by BAPCPA's reforms? A 2008 study by analysts in the 
Executive Office of the United States Trustee found a small but statistically 
significant increase in rates of plan confirmation post-BAPCP A. 157 The study 
compared the confirmation rate for cases filed in the year ending June 30, 2005, 
with that for cases filed in calendar year 2006. 158 The confirmation rate increased 
about 4%. 159 
The findings are not broken down by type of debtor. Therefore, it is not 
clear to what extent the post-BAPCPA increase is attributable to increases in rates 
of plan confirmation for small Chapter 11 debtors. Yet, even if the change in 
confirmation rates is attributable only to an increase in confirmation of small 
debtors' plans and even if it resulted exclusively from BAPCPA's reforms, 160 does 
a 4% increase in plan success merit the resources devoted to achieving it? 
The question brings to the fore our expectations for what Chapter 11 
should accomplish. It is possible that no amount of tinkering will create a 
substantial increase in plan confirmation rates for the small Chapter 11 debtor. If 
that is the case, then, as some commentators have suggested, a broader definition 
f b 0 d 161 o success may e m or er. 
157. See Ed Flynn & Phil Crewson, Chapter 11 Filing Trends in History and 
Today 6, Fig. 6 (2008), available at http://www.justice.gov/ust/eo/public_affairs/articles/ 
docs/2009/abi_ 200905. pdf. 
158. See id. at 6. 
159. See id. at 6, fig.6. The rate increased from 29.4% pre-BAPCPA to 33.2% 
post-BAPCP A. It is worth noting that the post-BAPCPA confirmation rate of 33.2% is only 
0.6% higher than the initial success rate found in this study. Therefore, it is possible that the 
post-BAPCP A increase found in the Executive Office study is nothing more than a normal 
variation in confirmation rates across time. 
160. See id. at 7 (stating that the "findings should not be viewed as conclusive 
evidence of a link between BAPCP A and the changes observed"). 
161. See supra notes 93-95 and accompanying text. 
